## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

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August 8, 1961

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Soviet Note on Berlin

Attached are two papers prepared in INR which Roger Hilsman thought might be of interest to you.


L. D. Battle

Executive Secretary

Attachments

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassified upon seminal of closeftes attachments in/20/16



TO

: The Acting Secretary

FROM

: DR - Thomas L. Hughes

ESTELLIGENCE NOTE: AUGUST 7 KHRUSHCHEV GPEECH OM BERLIN

Varning to Soviet People of Ver Danger. This is the principal new element found in the speech, a line Khrushchev predicted he would take during his talk with Mr. McCloy. By this Khrushchev probably hopes to achieve two aims -- (1) to buttress the credibility of Soviet warnings that the USER will conclude a separate treaty and will meet force with force, if need be, thus strengthening the Soviet hand in negotiations; and (2) to forestall further Western preparedness measures by not raising the Soviet ante at this stage, but by serving notice he will match them in the future with equivalent Soviet moves.

Fore Epecific on Regotiations. Mirushchev's appeal to the three Vestern powers to "sit at a round table for talks" is the most specific call for fourpower negotiations made in an authoritative Soviet statement since Moscow launched its current campaign on Berlin. While the speech suggested no more favorable terms than before for a negotiated settlement, neither did it specify that four-power talks must be held on the basis of Soviet proposals.

Bid for licutral Support. This Khrushchev attempted to accomplish by appealing directly to neutrals to check the threat of var, by denouncing the "mobilization" measures announced by the President as the source of this threat, by describing current and prospective Soviet measures as merely an "answer" to war-like UE moves, and by showing extreme sensitivity to charges that the UESR

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opposes self-determination.

Conclusions. Ehrushchev's twin tactics -- maintaining, even stepping up, his threats concerning the consequences of failure to negotiate the Soviet proposals, and at the same time, gradually broadening the possible terms of negotiations -- are clearly designed to induce the West to make a concrete and early offer to negotiate on terms close to Moscov's. Monotheless, we believe that the West's failure to take the initiative at an early date in proposing four-power talks would now be disadvantageous to us. In the absence of such a move, Moscov will be increasingly able to distort the Western position as the threat to peace and to win political support elsewhere in the world, thus strengthening its own position.



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TO : The Acting Secretary
FROM: INR - Thomas L. Hughes

INTELLIGENCE NOTE: WARSAW PACT COMMUNIQUE


Purpose of the Meeting. The purpose of the Angust 3-5 meeting of the party chicle of the Warsaw Pact countries was to impress the West with bloc determination to conclude a separate treaty with the East German regime if necessary and to enhance the bloc's bargaining position in negotiations. Timing the meeting to coincide with the Paris Forcign Ministers' Conference and with the dispatch of the Soviet notes to the Western powers also underscores this intent. Significantly, the meeting's communique made no mention of a discussion of military measures.

Deadline foliated. The communique emphasizes blee determination "to achieve a peace settlement with Germany before the end of this year" and threatens a separate treaty "should the Western powers continue to evade" a German treaty. It stops short, however, of stating that a treaty will be signed by the end of the year.

Discrepancies on Free City Plen. The communique repeats the standard line first West Berlin's citantion will be settled on the back of a peace treaty which will make it a free, domilitarized city. This relicration makes all the more curious the citatement in the August 3 Soviet note to the effect that agreement on a West Berlin "free city" would be reached after the peace treaty. Also, unlike earlier fleviet pronouncements, the communique does not specify with whom the GDR will conclude agreements guaranteeing "unbindered" access to Berlin; it merely states that such an agreement will be concluded.

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Participation at Meeting not Mentioned. Contrary to standard practice, the communique does not list the participants at the Moscow meeting. It refers only to "first secretaries of the Central Committees of the communist and workers' parties of the Warsaw Pact countries." One possible explanation of the lack of any detailed listing could be a desire to disguise Albania's non-participation on the party-chief level, if such was the case. Albania had deliborately under-represented itself at two of the three previous bloc conferences of the past year.

